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If there was any signiﬁcant change in the Chinese economic structure in the
1990s, it had to be privatization. By one report, 80 percent of the ﬁrms at
or below county level were privatized by the end of 1998 (Zhao 1999).1 Pri-
vatization also spread to large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in large
cities. A recent study (International Finance Corporation [IFC], forthcom-
ing)found that 70 percent of the SOEs in the eleven sample cities had taken
some form of privatization. However, the performance record of privatiza-
tion varied from city to city. A question then arises as to why such perfor-
mance disparity occurred. In this paper, we ﬁrst use recent survey data to
assess the regional performance disparity and then explain it. We ascribe
the disparity to the diﬀerent degrees of local government commitment to
privatization.
Privatization transfers the legal ownership of a public ﬁrm to private
hands, making the latter the residual claimant. However, privatization by
no means binds the government’s hand from intervening, nor does it bind
bureaucrats’ hands from grabbing. One serious problem that private ﬁrms
encounter in China is the excessive and irregular charges imposed by local
governments. For example, the survey that this study will draw data from
found that the amount of fees is equivalent to the amount of regular taxes
among the surveyed ﬁrms (Garnaut et al. 2001). Privatization cannot ex-
empt a ﬁrm from the excessive charges. In other words, privatization does
not mean the establishment of the rule of law. The lack of rule of law has
been identiﬁed by some authors as the most important factor that led to
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garded as county-level administrative units.Russia’s economic failures (e.g., Shleifer 1997). However, the establish-
ment of rule of law is not always in the politician’s interests; and, even if it
is, it may turn out not to be time-consistent for the politician. On the other
hand, having been through frequent policy changes by the government, the
manager of the ﬁrm may not trust it even if the establishment of the rule of
law is in the politician’s interests. Therefore, the politician has to establish
a credible commitment at the time of privatization just to induce good per-
formance or even to make privatization happen in the ﬁrst place.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 10.1 presents a brief review of
the Chinese government’s policy toward privatization in the last twenty
years. Section 10.2 shows the regional disparity in ﬁrm performance by
presenting the econometric results on six cities. Section 10.3 constructs a
theoretical model to explain the relationship between government commit-
ment and post-privatization performance. Section 10.4 presents the gov-
ernment reform experience in Shunde, Guangdong province, to provide an
illustration of the theory. Section 10.5 concludes the paper with a discus-
sion of the implications of the study.
10.1 Government Policy toward Privatization
Reform of the SOEs has been a major theme of China’s reform eﬀorts
since the urban reform was launched in 1984. Throughout the 1980s, al-
though there were calls for privatization, government emphasis was on
how to improve the performance of the SOEs by changing their internal
governance. Inspired by the success of the household responsibility system
in the countryside, one major eﬀort was to introduce a contracting system
into the SOEs. In such a system, the manager signed a contract with the
government on speciﬁc terms. The manager promised to maintain a certain
record of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position, including sales, proﬁtability, capital
accumulation, and so on. In return, the government promised the manager
certain returns, such as a commission, out of the proﬁt. One problem with
the contracting system was that the manager’s terms were asymmetric: the
manager would be rewarded for his successes, but would not be punished
credibly for his failure. As a result, personal collateral was introduced into
the system.
A further development was to adopt a lease contract: the manager leased
the ﬁrm by paying the government a ﬁxed proportion of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant case of a lease contract was the Wuhan Motor Engine
Factory in 1986, wherein three people invested 34,000 yuan as collateral to
lease the factory. By the end of the 1980s, lease contracts were encouraged
by the government as a means of reforming small SOEs. A State Council
regulation regarding the lease of small SOEs was issued in May 1988.2 One
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2. “Tentative Regulations on the Lease of Small State-Owned Industrial Enterprises,” the
State Council, 20 May 1988.direct consequence of the adoption of the lease contract was the introduc-
tion of private entrepreneurs into the management of SOEs, because man-
agers could be recruited from outside the enterprise. When it proliferated
into the countryside, leasehold in many cases led to the privatization of
township and village enterprises (TVEs). This happened when the manag-
ers could retain the ownership of the capital accumulated during the lease
period. After the manager leased the ﬁrm for several years, his own capital
would overwhelm the capital owned by the local government, and the ﬁrm
would eﬀectively be owned by the manager himself.
In addition to contracting and leasing, other reform measures that
would potentially lead to privatization were also adopted. Among them,
incorporation was the most signiﬁcant. In the beginning, the government
restricted incorporation to be conducted only among SOEs themselves.
However, private shares soon appeared. The ﬁrst case of private shares oc-
curred in three Guangzhou SOEs in 1986. In those three ﬁrms, employees
bought 30 percent of the total assets of each ﬁrm. The ﬁrst case of incor-
poration of a large SOE was in August 1988 when Shengyang Motor Cor-
poration was transformed into Shengyang Jinbei Motors Incorporated
through the issue of shares to the general public.
The opening of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shanghai
Stock Exchange in 1991 enabled SOEs to issue shares to the public widely.
However, the Chinese government implemented restrictive measures to
prevent the state from losing control of the newly listed SOEs. For example,
it required that a certain proportion of a ﬁrm’s shares not be sold.
Real privatization began after Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the south in 1992.
As with many other reform initiatives, privatization began with localities
and was then sanctioned by the central government. The most important
impetus for local privatization was the large amount of debt accumulated
in the state sector. This was a more pressing problem in small cities because
of their smaller economies. For example, in Zhucheng city, Shandong prov-
ince, among the 150 city-owned enterprises, 103 were in the red, and the
total loss was 147 million yuan, equivalent to the city government’s revenue
for 1.5 years (Zhao 1999). Shunde of Guangdong province had the same
problem when it ﬁrst started its privatization program in 1992. The solution
reached by the localities was to privatize small ﬁrms, but Shunde and
Zhucheng were more radical, privatizing almost all of their state and col-
lective ﬁrms. In 1995 the central government, after several rounds of inves-
tigation and discussion, formed a policy called zhuada fangxiao, or “keep
the larger and let the smaller go,” which limited the state’s authority to 500
to 1,000 large state ﬁrms and allowed smaller ﬁrms to be leased or sold.3
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3. In 1994, as the ministry in charge of the government’s economic aﬀairs, the State Eco-
nomic and Trade Commission sent a report, “Suggestions on Revitalizing Small State-Owned
Enterprises,” to vice premier Wu Banguo, who was in charge of enterprise reforms. In Sep-
tember 1995, the policy was formally announced by the central committee of the CCP in one
of its plenaries and was put into the suggestions to the ninth ﬁve-year plan.The government had a good reason for implementing this policy. In 1997,
the 500 largest state ﬁrms had 37 percent of the assets held by state indus-
trial ﬁrms, contributed 46 percent of the taxes collected on all state ﬁrms,
and accounted for 63 percent of the total proﬁt in the state sector. On the
other hand, smaller ﬁrms owned by local governments had worse perfor-
mance than those owned by the central government. In 1995, 24.3 percent
of the central ﬁrms were in the red, but 72.5 percent of the local ﬁrms were
in the red (Zhao 1999). Therefore, “Control of the (500) largest ﬁrms means
we have control of the largest chunk of the state economy.”4
From the “let the smaller go” part of the policy came the word gaizhi,
meaning “changing the system.” Starting in 1994, gaizhibegan to spread to
the whole country. The content of gaizhi included contracting and leasing,
the two methods used before, as well as new methods such as selling to pri-
vate owners, employee-holding, incorporation, listing on the stock market,
restructuring of internal and external governance, and bankruptcy. By in-
ternational standards, gaizhi really is privatization.
One aspect of gaizhiwas to remove the “red hat” for red-hat ﬁrms—that
is, ﬁrms with a collective face that were actually run privately. In March
1998, the government issued a directive requiring all red-hat ﬁrms to take
oﬀ their hats by November 1998.
Sichuan provides an example of gaizhi. In 1994, the provincial govern-
ment began to implement gaizhi, starting with county-owned enterprises.
By the end of 1998, the province ended gaizhifor 68.6 percent of the 42,681
ﬁrms that were targeted for gaizhi.Among those transformed, 35.1 percent
were transformed into employee-owned companies, 11 percent were trans-
formed into employee-owned cooperatives, 14.3 percent were sold, 7 per-
cent were contracted out to individuals, 8.5 percent were leased out, 7 per-
cent were bankrupt, and 5 percent were taken over by other ﬁrms.
Privatization in general was more popular in the countryside. After
1993, many localities that had been renowned for their development of the
collective economy, including Shunde and southern Jiangsu, began to im-
plement massive privatization. TVEs used to have vaguely deﬁned prop-
erty rights that did not maintain clear-cut deﬁnitions of who—the entre-
preneur or the government or both—owned the enterprises. Because of
their marvelous growth records, TVEs have been hailed by some authors
as posing a challenge to the neoclassical doctrine of clearly deﬁned owner-
ship (e.g., Weitzman and Xu 1994). However, as TVE growth slowed down
in the 1990s, the disadvantages of their vaguely deﬁned property rights
were acknowledged by academic researchers. Like their urban counter-
parts, the SOEs, TVEs suﬀered a soft-budget problem (Zhang 1998). Lo-
cal governments felt the problem earlier because they shouldered a con-
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4. Vice premier Wu Banguo’s speech in the national conference on economy, 20 December
1997. Quoted in Zhao (1999).siderable amount of debts accumulated by their TVEs’ nonperforming
loans. Financial crisis led the government to seek institutional change (e.g.,
North and Weingast 1989). Li, Li, and Zhang (2000) showed with a theo-
retical model that ﬁnancial competition among local governments was a
major cause of China’s local privatization initiatives. The evolution of gov-
ernment policy toward privatization in China, especially in the 1990s, ex-
empliﬁed the theory.5
However, the wave of privatization initiated by gaizhi in 1998 met the
criticism that it led to the loss of state assets. The government also lowered
its tone on privatization. Some localities stopped their privatization pro-
grams; more of them lowered their proﬁles to avoid being subject to the
criticism. The new constitutional amendment enacted in early 1999 elicited
a new round of privatization. It was estimated that 70 percent of the SOEs
had been privatized by the end of 2002 (IFC, forthcoming). By interna-
tional standards, gaizhi thus qualiﬁes as a property-rights revolution, al-
though this revolution has been largely silent.
10.2 Regional Disparity in Firm Performance
Although privatization has spread cross the country, its outcome is not
uniform. Liu, Wang, and Yao (2001) showed that many privatized ﬁrms in
southern Jiangsu, a region once famous for its collective ﬁrms, had prob-
lems. On the one hand, asset stripping was rampant in newly privatized
ﬁrms; on the other hand, the local economy had regressed to one based on
small, family workshops. Qin (1998) found a similar phenomenon in this
region. However, there were better performers, too. Zhucheng of Shan-
dong province and Shunde of Guangdong province have performed quite
well. In this section, we use ﬁrm-level data from a 1999 survey to assess the
post-privatization performance in six cities: Beijing, Chengdu, Wenzhou,
Shunde, Deyang, and Mianyang.6 Beijing is the national capital; Chengdu
is the capital of the Sichuan province, located in southwest of China; Wen-
zhou is a prefecture-level city in southern Zhejiang province; Shunde is lo-
cated in the Pearl River delta, close to Macao; and Deyang and Mianyang
are two cities in Sichuan province. Except for Beijing, all the other cities are
renowned for their recent development of private ﬁrms, many of which
are privatized ﬁrms. The survey was designed to study China’s emerging
private sector, so ﬁrms included in the survey are mostly private ﬁrms. This
makes the study of post-privatization performance easier, because it con-
trols for within-ﬁrm incentive problems that frequently are found in public
ﬁrms. Data on ﬁrm performance and other relevant information were col-
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5. In this respect, Zhao (1999) is a nice reference.
6. The survey was organized by IFC in 1999. For a description of the survey, see Garnaut
et al. (2001).lected for 1995 and 1998. The total number of ﬁrms covered by the survey
was 629. However, this study is limited to the ﬁrms that provided valid in-
formation, so the sample size is smaller.
We study three performance indicators: value-added, pretax return to
capital, and the growth of capital stock in the period 1995 to 1998. We use
value-added instead of output because the former is a better measure of
performance; besides, we do not have enough valid data for intermediate
inputs. Conﬁned by data availability, we have to limit the study of value-
added and pretax proﬁt rates to the year 1998. The study of the growth of
the capital stock is especially interesting because it reﬂects entrepreneurs’
conﬁdence in the local economy. The aim of the study is to assess the per-
formance diﬀerence between the six cities after ﬁrm-level characteristics
are controlled for.
For value-added, we ﬁrst run a Cobb-Douglas value-added production
function with labor and capital as inputs. Value-added is measured in
10,000 yuan, labor is the number of employees of a ﬁrm, and capital is the
original value of the capital stock at the end of 1998 (measured in 10,000
yuan). We do not have good data on capital depreciation so we cannot use
net capital value.
In addition to the two inputs, we use other variables to control for ﬁrm
eﬃciency. These variables can be assigned to three groups. The ﬁrst is ﬁrm
characteristics. These include ratio of college-and-above graduates in man-
agement, the percentage of self-ﬁnance when the ﬁrm was ﬁrst established,
the degree of competition in the industry, whether there are entry barriers
to the industry, whether the ﬁrm is an exporter, and the ﬁrm’s ownership
status. The ratio of college-and-above graduates measures the stock of hu-
man capital in management and thus (partly) controls for the ﬁrm’s inno-
vative capacity. Self-ﬁnance is relative to borrowing from formal ﬁnancial
institutions; it includes owners’ own savings and borrowing from friends
and relatives. On the one hand, it controls for the constraints that a ﬁrm
faces in the ﬁnancial market; therefore, more self-ﬁnance may entail
smaller chances of success. However, more self-ﬁnance also imposes more
self-discipline on the ﬁrm and forces it to use funds more wisely. Therefore,
the sign on the eﬀect of this variable is undetermined.
Degree of competition takes three values: 1   heated competition, 2  
modest competition, and 3   no competition. Less competition in the in-
dustry implies a stronger monopoly position for the ﬁrm in the market; we
expect this variable to have a positive eﬀect on productivity. Entry barrier
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 indicating that the barrier exists, and
a value of zero meaning no barrier. Entry barrier takes the form of licens-
ing and other government approvals. Firms in an industry with entry bar-
rier enjoy more monopoly power, so we expect that this variable would con-
tribute positively to a ﬁrm’s productivity.
Export status controls for a ﬁrm’s international linkage, and it is ex-
256 Yang Yaopected that an exporter will perform better than a nonexporter. Ownership
is grouped into three categories: domestic SOEs and collective ﬁrms, do-
mestic private ﬁrms, and foreign ﬁrms and joint ventures. The ﬁrst cate-
gory is used as the reference group in the regressions.
The second group of variables is city dummies. If not otherwise deﬁned,
Shunde is used as the reference city in the regressions. For the purpose of
the current study, this group of variables is key to our understanding of re-
gional performance disparities.
The third group of variables is industrial dummies. We grouped the ﬁrms
into six large industries: primary (mining, logging, and agriculture); light
manufacturing (food, garments, furniture, and sports and oﬃce supplies);
heavy manufacturing (chemicals, metal and nonmetal reﬁnement and
manufacturing); machinery; electronics; and others. The last industry is
used as the reference group.
There are 247 ﬁrms with valid data. Distribution of those ﬁrms is as fol-
lows: Beijing 116, Shunde 24, Chengdu 36, Wenzhou 32, Deyang 10, and
Mianyang 29. Beijing turns out to have more ﬁrms with valid data. This is
because Beijing had better organizational arrangements when the survey
was implemented.
The results of the value-added production function are presented in col-
umn (1) of table 10.1. To save space, the results for the industrial dummies
are not reported. The output elasticities for labor and capital are 0.99 and
0.20, respectively, indicating weak increasing returns to scale. Among the
ﬁrm characteristics, only the percentage of self-ﬁnance is signiﬁcant. It has
a positive sign, showing that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial discipline outweighs the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraint. Among the city dummies, all but Deyang have
a negative sign, and the coeﬃcient for Beijing is signiﬁcant. This shows that
ﬁrms in Shunde might be more eﬃcient than those in the other cities. To fur-
ther explore this possibility, we rerun the regression by grouping all ﬁve cities
except Shunde into one group and studying their diﬀerence from Shunde.
The results are reported in column (2) of table 10.1. Although the estimate
for Shunde is not statistically signiﬁcant, the size of the diﬀerence is large.
Firms in Shunde are 46.5 percent more eﬃcient than ﬁrms in the other cities.
The third and fourth columns in table 10.1 report two more regressions
on value-added. The dependent variable is value-added per yuan of capi-
tal. This time, a new variable—capital per worker—is added to the regres-
sion. The ﬁrst regression takes Shunde as the reference city and puts in all
the other city dummies. Now, all the cities except Deyang are shown to be
signiﬁcantly inferior to Shunde. The diﬀerence ranges from 10.4 yuan (1.25
dollars) to 12.5 yuan (1.50 dollars), which is substantial. The second re-
gression then takes the previous approach, to group all the other cities to-
gether. The estimation puts the diﬀerence between Shunde and the other
cities at 11.5 yuan (1.39 dollars), which is highly signiﬁcant. Therefore,
Shunde is far more eﬃcient than the other cities in utilizing its capital.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.This is shown further by the estimation of pretax proﬁt per yuan of cap-
ital. The results of two regressions are reported in the last two columns in
table 10.1. The deﬁnitions of the two regressions are the same as before. In
the ﬁrst regression, all the other cities are shown to be slightly less eﬃcient
than Shunde. The second regression then shows that the diﬀerence be-
tween Shunde and the other cities is 4.38 yuan (53 cents), which is signiﬁ-
cant at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. It is noteworthy that an exporter
is signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than a nonexporter in terms of proﬁtability, a
result contrary to our expectation. One explanation is that Chinese ex-
porters frequently are engaged in price competition, so their proﬁt margins
are narrowed. However, the fact that ﬁrms are still engaged in exporting
shows that they might get indirect beneﬁts such as tax returns and foreign
currency retention.
Finally, the results on capital growth are presented in table 10.2. Growth
is deﬁned as (capital stock of 1998 – capital stock of 1995)/(capital stock of
1995). Because of the limitation of valid data, the sample size shrinks to
sixty-three ﬁrms. On average, the ﬁrms grew 8.43 times in the three-year
period. However, the variation is large. The distribution, from the highest
to the lowest, is as follows: Deyang, 21.5 times (six ﬁrms), Shunde, 15.5
times (six ﬁrms), Beijing, 6.4 times (fourteen ﬁrms), Mianyang, 8.1 times
(seventeen ﬁrms), Wenzhou, 4.1 times (fourteen ﬁrms), and Chengdu, 3.9
times (six ﬁrms). To maintain degrees of freedom, industrial dummies are
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Capital in 1995 (10,000 yuan) –0.0018**
(0.0011)
Ratio of college-and-above graduates –1.181
in management (5.138)
Percentage of self-ﬁnance when  –3.087
ﬁrm was established (5.003)
Degree of competition –6.117*
(2.938)







Notes: 63 ﬁrms. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.excluded. In addition, we only explore the diﬀerence between Shunde and
the other cities as a whole. However, we add the capital stock in 1995 to
control for initial ﬁrm size. Understandably, the results show that capital
stock in 1995 has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on capital growth. Another
signiﬁcant result is that exporters have experienced much higher growth.
Less comprehensible is the result that a ﬁrm in a less competitive industry
tends to have a smaller growth rate. The most important result in terms of
our concern is that Shunde has a signiﬁcantly higher growth rate than
other cities, with the diﬀerence being 11.8 times.
To summarize these empirical results, we ﬁnd that Shunde has been con-
sistently doing better than the other cities. The task remaining is to explain
Shunde’s better performance. In the regressions, we relied on the city dum-
mies to assess regional diﬀerences, but the dummies can carry the eﬀects of
a lot of uncontrolled regional characteristics. Here we would like to con-
centrate on a single aspect of the problem, that is, the regularity of govern-
ment administration. Privatization gives private owners legal ownership of
the ﬁrm, but does not automatically guarantee that the government will
protect that ownership. In this respect, Shunde has done much better than
the other cities. It conducted a radical government reform concurrently
with its privatization program. In the next section, we present a theoretical
model to show that government commitment to the protection of private
ownership is the key to successful privatization. The commitment is shown
by the government’s stripping of its own power. In section 10.4, we come
back to the case of Shunde by presenting a description of its government
reform.
10.3 A Model of Government Commitment and Privatization
In this section, we present a formal model explaining the relationship be-
tween government reform and ﬁrm performance. First, however, we pro-
vide a verbal description of the ideas behind the model.
Consider an economy composed of a ﬁrm, a politician, and a ﬁrm man-
ager. The ﬁrm initially is publicly owned. The manager is delegated to man-
aging the ﬁrm with a ﬁxed wage, so he also provides a ﬁxed amount of ef-
fort. A politician leads a bureaucracy of many bureaucrats and delegates
to them the regulations of the ﬁrm. In the Chinese context, regulations in-
clude project approval and direct intervention into the ﬁrm’s management
aﬀairs (such as employment target, wage determination, investment deci-
sions, etc.) as well as other regular regulatory activities such as taxation,
standard enforcement, and so on. However, if they are unregulated, these
bureaucrats tend to be corrupt and to grab from the ﬁrm, and these regu-
latory functions provide a vehicle for that grab. The politician needs these
functions to achieve particular goals that are valuable to him. One example
is that maintaining full employment increases his popularity among a cer-
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speciﬁc industrial policy drives out some industries (like those creating
heavy pollution) that he thinks are bad for the local economy. In addition,
the politician cares about the opinion of the general public and the support
of his subordinates. The general public cares about the revenue of the ﬁrm,
and the bureaucrats care about their “grabbing capacities.” Therefore, the
proﬁt of the ﬁrm, intervention power, and the bureaucrats’ grabbing ca-
pacities all enter his utility.
A governance reform is deﬁned as the establishment of the rule of law
that eliminates the bureaucrats’ grabbing from the ﬁrm. The reform is
diﬀerent from eliminating government intervention into the ﬁrm. Under
certain circumstances (such as the Mao Zedong era in China), government
intervention does not necessarily lead to corruption. However, it facili-
tates, if not directly causes, corruption in most cases. We assume that it is
at the politician’s discretion whether to take the reform and eliminate his
subordinates’ grabbing power. Under public ownership of the ﬁrm, the
manager’s supply of eﬀort does not respond to the grab, so corruption is
not harmful to the politician and he will not undertake the reform.
Privatization is a shift in ownership that makes the manager the residual
claimant. It does not guarantee that government intervention disappears
along with the ownership shift, though. Because the manager begins to re-
spond to the severity of the grabbing hand, corruption becomes costly to
the politician, and it may be an eﬃcient decision for him ex ante to conduct
the governance reform along with privatization. More importantly, the
manager will not take the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst place, and privatization will fail
if the governance reform is not undertaken. Therefore, the two reforms are
preconditions for each other. Nevertheless, there is a critical diﬀerence be-
tween them: While the ownership reform is irreversible, the governance re-
form has a time-consistency problem. If the manager believed the politi-
cian and provided eﬀort, it would be in the politician’s interest to renege, in
other words, to let loose the corruption. But the manager can envision this
reneging behavior perfectly and will take precautions in advance, probably
providing the eﬀort that he provided under public ownership. As a result,
privatization will not be an attractive choice for either the politician or the
manager. This is a typical time-inconsistency and subsequent ineﬃciency
problem in which a player cannot make a binding commitment.
However, this problem may merely arise as a result of the limited num-
ber of choices that are available to the players. In the real world, the num-
ber of choices that a player can choose from is large and once they have
been made, some of them become binding constraints on the player (he
may be held legally responsible to keep the choices). Even a government in
a totalitarian state cannot be totally free of observing its choices. In our
case, removing government intervention can be made a binding constraint
(probably through the privatization contract) on the politician; if this is
done, it can serve as a credible commitment for the politician to stick to the
262 Yang Yaogovernance reform because, by removal of the intervention, corruption be-
comes more visible and its cost to the politician becomes higher.
The commitment mechanism discussed here is diﬀerent from those fre-
quently appearing in recent literature that concentrates on the decentral-
ization of decision making (e.g., North and Weingast 1989; Qian and Wein-
gast 1996, 1997; and Zhang and Li 1998). Here the commitment can be
termed “burning the bridge,” a military tactic that can be traced back to
Chinese Han dynasty two thousand years ago. In one battle, General Han
Xin brought his army to a big river, crossed it, and burned down the bridge
over it, so that no retreating route was left for his men and the only hope
for them to survive was to defeat the enemy. They did that. In this story,
Han Xin had another choice: taking the army over the river (and burning
down the bridges over it), in addition to killing retreating soldiers himself.
The former was an automatic binding constraint on his men and himself,
because retreating into the river would mean immediate death; the latter,
however, was not, because even he wanted to kill all the cowards, many of
whom would succeed in escaping from the messy battleﬁeld.
10.3.1 Settings
The economy is composed of a ﬁrm, a politician, and a ﬁrm manager.
The ﬁrm is initially publicly owned. The manager is delegated to manage
the ﬁrm. We assume that public ownership makes an incentive contract in-
feasible for the manager. This assumption can be justiﬁed on the grounds
of the soft budget constraint ﬁrst proposed by Kornai (1979) and later re-
ﬁned by Qian (1994) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). Therefore, we
assume that the manager provides a ﬁxed amount of eﬀort, e0, for ﬁrm
management. At this level of eﬀort, the disutility to the manager is zero.
Consistently, the wage that the manager gets is also normalized to zero.
In the meantime, the politician maintains a certain level of intervention
s   [0, 1], say, that is delegated to the bureaucrats to implement on the ﬁrm.
However, the bureaucrats tend to grab from the ﬁrm if they are not prop-
erly checked. We assume that their total grab is proportional to the ﬁrm’s
revenue, with the proportion being t   [0, 1]. The grab also brings a dead-
weight loss to the ﬁrm. In summary, we can specify the ﬁrm’s net revenue as
(1) R    e0   at,
where   1 is a parameter representing the ﬁrm’s market conditions,
and a is a positive number measuring the intensity of the deadweight loss
brought about by the grabbing. A larger   implies a stronger local econ-
omy. To structure the discussion, we set a boundary condition that R is
nonnegative for any t and s.7
Government Commitment and the Outcome of Privatization in China 263
7. This assumption is inessential to our results; but since the revenue function and the
politician’s utility to be introduced later are both linear, we need this assumption as a bound-
ary condition. With this boundary condition, our analysis will be simpliﬁed technically.The politician cares about the general public’s interest, the support of
the bureaucrats, and the result of the intervention. The public’s interest can
be represented by the size of R,8 the support of the bureaucrats by t, and
the result of the intervention by s. However, corruption also has a cost to
the politician, and the cost is likely to increase as t becomes larger. Never-
theless, government intervention can serve as a disguise and a damage-
control device and mitigates the cost. These concerns are best represented
in the politician’s utility function (all in monetary terms)
U   R    1t   s   ( 2    s)t,
where  1,  2,  , and   are all positive numbers. In the equation,   repre-
sents the weight that the politician puts on the result of the intervention,  1
represents the support of the bureaucrats, and the sum  2 –  s represents
the cost of corruption. Collecting and rearranging terms, we have
(2) U   R    t    s    ts,
where     1    2. Then  t    ts is the net gain from granting the bu-
reaucrats the grabbing power. We assume that  is larger than 1, that is, that
the politician values more of the special interests achieved by intervention
than the general public’s interest.
Governance reform is deﬁned as the politician’s elimination of the cor-
ruption and setting t equal to zero. As the setup shows, the interests in-
volved may prevent it from happening.
10.3.2 Public Ownership
Governance reform may not be desirable for the politician under public
ownership of the ﬁrm. Because his utility increases monotonically with s,
the politician will set s equal to 1. He will also set t   1 because his utility
is linear in t. If that is the case, his utility is
(3) Uc
0    e0   a        .
With governance reform, t is set equal to zero, and his utility is
(4) U∗
0    e0    .
However, setting t   0 may not be compatible with the politician’s incen-
tive if the following condition holds:
(5)     a
It is noteworthy that this condition has nothing to do with  , so the gov-
ernment of a city with a stronger economy does not have a stronger incentive
to engage in governance reform than the government of a city with a weaker
economy. We will show that with privatization, governance reform could oc-
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8. Alternatively, one can also interpret this assumption as the politician’s concern on tax
revenue—a larger economy implies more tax revenue to the government.cur even when equation (5) holds; that is, privatization would give the politi-
cian an extra incentive to engage in the reform. On the other hand, only when
the reform is carried out and committed to by the politician will privatiza-
tion be a Pareto improvement to both the politician and the manager.
10.3.3 Governance Reform and Privatization
Privatization shifts the ownership of ﬁrm from the government to the
ﬁrm manager and makes the latter the residue claimant.9 We let the politi-
cian and the manager play the following game.
On day 1, the politician announces whether to privatize the ﬁrm and de-
termines the level of intervention in the ﬁrm. On day 2, the manager de-
cides whether to accept the oﬀer of privatization and, if he does, how much
eﬀort to put into the ﬁrm. On day 3, the politician decides whether to en-
gage in governance reform and the production is carried out.
We assume that privatization and the politician’s decision about inter-
vention in the ﬁrm are irreversible and observable by the manager. We put
the politician’s decision about governance reform after the manager’s eﬀort
to capture the nonenforceability of the reform. To wit, it may be an ex ante
optimal decision for the politician to engage in the reform (i.e., to set t be
zero), but if the manager believed the politician and acted accordingly, it
would be in his interest to renege and give up the reform afterward (i.e., to
revert to corruption). However, the manager can well envision the politi-
cian’s time-inconsistency problem and act accordingly. Like the feature
shared by the time-consistency literature, this will result in ineﬃcient out-
come. In what follows, we will ﬁrst replicate this standard result and then
propose two commitment mechanisms that the politician can use to com-
mit himself to his ex ante eﬃcient decisions.
We start with the politician’s ex ante eﬃcient decisions on day 1. In mak-
ing these decisions, he takes into account the manager’s response to the
grabbing hand because the latter now becomes the residual claimant of the
ﬁrm. For any level of eﬀort e, the disutility (in monetary terms) to the man-
ager is (1/2) (e – e0)2, where   is a positive number. He maximizes his net
proﬁt   (1 – t)( e – at) – (1/2) (e – e0)2 by choosing his eﬀort e. This im-
mediately gives us a solution to e, e(t)    (1 – t)/  e0. Taking this for
granted, the politician maximizes his utility by choosing t and s, that is, he
solves the following problem:
(6) max
s,t
U   [ e(t)   at]    t    s    ts
The optimal solution to s is still 1. To make governance reform (i.e., t   0)
attractive to the politician, we need that the marginal utility of t be nega-
tive, that is,
Government Commitment and the Outcome of Privatization in China 265
9. Implicitly, we assume that the ﬁrm is given to the manager for free. While it could be jus-
tiﬁed by empirical ﬁndings on Russia and to some extent, on China (Garnaut et al. 2001), this
assumption is made to simplify our analysis and allows us to concentrate on the incentive







The left-hand side of this condition is the marginal beneﬁt of corruption,
and the right-hand side is the marginal cost of corruption that includes the
deadweight loss and an extra cost due to the manager’s lost incentive. The
inequality may hold even if equation (5) holds. Therefore, governance re-
form is easier with privatization than under public ownership. This is be-
cause now the manager’s eﬀort responds to the grabbing hand and an in-
crease in t causes an extra cost of a factor  2 due to the manager’s lost
incentive. It is noteworthy that government reform is easier under a larger
 , in other words, a city with a more prosperous local economy will be more
likely to take the reform.
If equation (7) holds, t is set to 0 at which the manager’s supply of eﬀort
is e∗   /  e0, and the politician’s utility is




     e0    .
Obviously, U∗ is greater than U∗
0. Under equation (7), U∗ is also greater
than Uc
0. Therefore, privatization makes the politician better oﬀ if he can
commit himself to the governance reform. On the other hand, the surplus
left to the manager is all the ﬁrm’s revenue  2/    e0, so his net utility is
 e0   0.5 2/ , which is positive. Finally, the general public is also pleased
because the ﬁrm’s revenue increased from  e0 – a to  2/    e0. Therefore,
we have the following proposition:
P1.If the politician can commit to governance reform, privati-
zation will be a Pareto improvement to the politician, the manager and the
general public.
However, governance reform may not be time consistent for the politi-
cian, because if the manager spent e∗ on day 2, he might gain by loosening
his control on his subordinates on day 3. To examine this possibility, we
note that the marginal utility of t on day 3 is the same as in the case before
privatization, which is positive by equation (5). Therefore, sticking to gov-
ernance reform is not an ex post optimal choice for the politician. Of
course, the manager can readily envision the politician’s opportunist be-
havior and would have not provided e∗ on day 2. Since the tax rate under
corruption is 1 when the number of bureaucrats is large, the manager will
provide e0, exactly what he did under public ownership. Hence, both the
manager and the politician are made indiﬀerent between public ownership
and privatization. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
P 2. Without commitment to governance reform, privatization
will not be a better choice for both the politician and the manager.
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dilemma, the politician has to make a credible commitment on day 1 assur-
ing the manager that he will stick to governance reform. This can be done
by setting s equal to zero. When s is zero, the marginal utility of t on day 3
becomes –a    , which is negative if
(9)   a.
This condition implies that the weight of the bureaucrats’ support is less
than the intensity of deadweight loss caused by grabbing if corruption is
exposed because of open government intervention. Whether this is true
depends on the politician’s preference and the severity of the deadweight
loss, yet it is clear that it can happen even when equation (5) holds. The
politician’s utility under commitment is




     e0,
which is smaller than U∗. That is, commitment is costly to the politician.
However, his utility still can be larger than the most he can get under public
ownership, Uc
0, if the following condition holds




    a.
The left-hand side is the cost of privatization and commitment, and the
right-hand side is the gain from it. So the condition requires that the gain
be larger than the cost. If this condition holds, the manager still gets  e0  
0.5 2/ , the same as what he gets when there is no commitment problem.
The revenue of the ﬁrm also reaches the highest  e0    2/ .
This is a good time to reiterate the conditions under which the commit-
ment problem arises and can be overcome. They are conditions in equa-
tions (5), (9), and (11). The permissible parameter region deﬁned by these
three conditions is shown in ﬁgure 10.1. Notice that the size of the region
depends on the relative sizes of  2and  . If the latter is greater than the for-
mer, then the permissible region vanishes. Therefore, the robustness of the
local economy and the weight that the politician puts on special interests
and goals are critical. Thus, we have the following proposition:
P 3. Commitment to governance reform can happen only if the
local economy is robust and/or the politician cares less about special interests.
10.4 Government Reform in Shunde
The government reform in Shunde began in 1993 and ended in 1999. It
was radical by any measure. It was a top-down reform starting with the
municipal government itself. It downsized the government by nearly half
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of the number of employees, transformed the functions of the government,
increased the transparency of government administration, and enhanced
the rule of law. In this section, we ﬁrst provide a description of the reform,
and then analyze the factors leading to its success, putting the emphasis on
its linkage with privatization. At the end of the section, we conclude with a
discussion of future problems.
10.4.1 Accomplishments of the Reform
The major pieces of the Shunde government reform are consolidation
of government agencies and downsizing, transformation of government
functions, establishment of administrative transparency, and enhanced ef-
ﬁciency and rule of law. Before the reform, there were 62 regular govern-
ment agencies and more than 100 temporary agencies in the municipal
government. The reform trimmed the number of regular agencies to 36 and
eliminated 80 temporary agencies (Jiang 1999). All the intermediary com-
mittees between bureaus and the mayor were eliminated, and many bu-
reaus with similar functions were combined. The most radical act was to
combine the parallel departments in the government and the party organ.
For example, the government secretary oﬃce was combined with the party
secretary oﬃce; the Department of Organization and the Department of
Veteran Leaders in the party organ were combined with the Department of
Personnel in the government; and the party discipline committee was com-
bined with the Bureau of Inspection in the government. The party organ is
an indispensable entity in Chinese politics and government administra-
tion. Important government policies and directives are determined by the
standing committee of the Communist Party, and the government’s re-
sponsibility is only implementation. The consolidation of government and
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Fig. 10.1 Permissible parameter region for proposition 3party departments enhances the characteristics of a party-state and its
long-term merits can be much disputed, but it is a practical choice to down-
size the government precisely because the Shunde reform was conﬁned
by China’s party-state establishment.
In addition to cutting the number of government agencies, Shunde’s
government reform also took a tough position on government employees.
Before the reform, there were 1,235 employees in the municipal govern-
ment; the reform made a 25.8 percent cut and downsized the government
to only 916 employees. This is really a small government in terms of the
city’s own population of 1.2 million and a similar population of migrants.
However, the 319 employees who left the government were not simply laid
oﬀ; 284 of them were transferred into newly founded businesses that had
been transformed from government agencies, 15 people took early retire-
ment, 8 people were transferred to townships, and only 12 people found
their own employment. As a result, the resistance to the reform was less-
ened considerably. The real test, however, was the 123 oﬃcials whose ranks
were lowered or even stripped oﬀ (Jiang 1999).
The downsizing not only could meet the resistance of those who lost
their privileges, but also constituted a potential conﬂict with higher gov-
ernment establishments. A standard practice in China is that lower-level
governments have to have the same, if not more, departments that a higher
government has. The elimination and consolidation of departments in
Shunde thus raised potential conﬂicts with the Guangdong provincial gov-
ernment. The way that this problem was solved was that each remaining
department assumed more responsibilities and the work intensity of the re-
maining employees increased dramatically.
Downsizing the government cannot be sustained if its functions are not
transformed. Shunde teaches us a lesson on that. In 1984, it had a govern-
ment reform that cut nine government agencies and 171 people. However,
because the government was still deeply involved in the management of the
economy, the size of government quickly increased again. By 1987, the
number of agencies increased by ten, to sixty-six, and the number of em-
ployees increased by 378, to 1,299 (Jiang 1999). The 1993 reform not only
consolidated government agencies but also stripped many functions once
assumed by the old agencies. This was made possible by the ownership re-
form. Before the reform, the government needed one bureau to manage the
municipal-level ﬁrms and another bureau to provide administrative guid-
ance to ﬁrms at the township and village levels. It also had separate bureaus
in charge of domestic trade, international trade and cooperation, customs,
rural trade, and tourism. After the reform, the two bureaus in charge of in-
dustry were combined into the Bureau of Industrial Development, and the
other bureaus in charge of trade issues were combined into the Bureau
of Trade Development. Together with the consolidation, the functions of
these bureaus were reduced considerably. For example, the new industrial
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aﬀairs of the old municipal ﬁrms, most of which have been privatized.
Since their functions have been reduced, the industrial and trade bureaus
are in the process of merging into one bureau.
The reform has reduced the government’s role in economic management
to a minimum, but the government has not become a ﬁgurehead. The
Shunde government still maintains an active role in attracting investments,
creating jobs, enforcing government regulations, providing local public
goods, and managing an active industrial policy. This last function is di-
rected mainly toward environmental protection. Shunde has large textile,
dyeing, and tile industries that pollute heavily. As income increases, public
demand for clean water and air has increased considerably. The Shunde
government consciously rejects projects in these industries and uses taxa-
tion to force small labor-intensive and polluting ﬁrms out of business. This
deﬁnitely aﬀects employment, but it is unknown how serious the adverse
eﬀect is.
One striking change after the reform is the increase in transparency and
eﬃciency in the Shunde government’s administration. This is exempliﬁed
by its reform of its project approval process. The rule in China is that the
government has the power to determine whether a project is worthwhile for
the economy. The provincial-level government and cities designated to
have separate ﬁscal plans can approve a domestic project with an invest-
ment of less than 30 million yuan renminbi, or a foreign direct investment
project with an investment of less than 30 million U.S. dollars; beyond that,
the project has to be approved by the central government. To get a project
approved and the ﬁrm established, the owner has to have the patience to go
through the maze-like government bureaucracy, spending considerable
amounts of time and ﬁnancial resources. The Shunde government cannot
break the rule of approval, but has substantially increased the transpar-
ency and eﬀectiveness of the approval process. Their innovation was to es-
tablish one approval oﬃce that provides “one-stop” approval for a project:
it has the power to hand over the approval and is also responsible for
preparing all the necessary documents for the project. This saves tremen-
dously on the owner’s eﬀorts and increases the transparency of the ap-
proval process.
Another sign of transparency is the monthly administrative bulletin
Shunde Administrative Aﬀairs, published by the government. The bulletin
publishes the newest laws and regulations issued by various levels of gov-
ernment and is sent to larger ﬁrms as well as to public venues, like hotels.
This bulletin is unique among Chinese cities and serves as a bridge between
the government and the private sector.
In relation to economic performance, the most important change
brought about by Shunde’s government reform is the increased regularity
of government administration and the enhanced rule of law. This is shown
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ulations, or policies took place in the last three years that aﬀected a ﬁrm’s
business, the average answer in Shunde was 0.36 while the average for all
the six surveyed cities was 2.54. In particular, Beijing had 6.19 times. Al-
though Shunde’s government levies were not the lowest among the six
cities, they were certainly the most stable. For example, for fees (the most
variable part of government levies), its coeﬃcient of variation was 0.84 for
Shunde, but in the range of 1.30 to 1.77 for the other ﬁve cities (Zhi 2001).
Therefore, the policy environment is much more predictable in Shunde
than in other cities. In addition, more people in Shunde than in other cities
trusted the court when they had a dispute. There were 40.6 percent of the
ﬁrms in Shunde that checked “going to the court” as a solution to a dis-
pute, while the average for all the cities was 30.7 percent.
10.4.2 Factors Leading to the Success of the Reform
The success of the Shunde government reform is closely tied to its own-
ership reform, a visionary and strong leadership, a prosperous local econ-
omy, and meticulous design of the reform. As the review in the last section
showed, the ownership reform was brought about by the ﬁnancial prob-
lems faced by the public ﬁrms. Our theoretical model in section 10.3 then
showed that ownership reform creates conditions for government reform.
This is because, on the one hand, ownership reform makes ﬁrm managers
the residual claimants, so they become sensitive to irregularities in govern-
ment administration and law enforcement. On the other hand, ownership
reform dispenses with many government functions. Both increase the
politician’s costs to maintaining a large and loosely controlled government,
so his incentive to launch government reform is enhanced. In return, gov-
ernment reform sets down a credible commitment to better state gover-
nance and reduced corruption, so privatization results in good ﬁrm per-
formance. As a result, government reform and privatization create a
synergy for a better economy.
In addition to the conditions created by privatization, the role played by
Shunde’s leadership was also indispensable in bringing about the govern-
ment reform. Our theoretical model predicts that the politician’s prefer-
ence is an important factor in determining the possibility of the reform. In
Shunde, the reform-oriented leadership played a pivotal role in its owner-
ship and government reforms. The party secretary is young, open-minded,
and determined to engage in reform. Under his inﬂuence, the whole lead-
ership team adopted a new philosophy toward government administration;
that is, the government should draw away from direct engagement in eco-
nomic aﬀairs and instead should concentrate on the provision of public
goods (including the provision of a fair, just, and open competitive envi-
ronment) and implementation of the law. After several years of reform
eﬀorts, this new philosophy has gained popularity in the government and
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oﬃcials. No matter how thorough the reform is, the formal rules thus es-
tablished still would be incomplete and government oﬃcials still would be
empowered with a considerable degree of discretion in their decision mak-
ing. Under this situation, informal constraints such as the new philosophy
established in Shunde become important. One example of the eﬀect of this
informal constraint is the failure of the Bureau of Industrial Development
to establish a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) service center that
was to provide charged services to SMEs. The bureau sent the proposal
to the government oﬃce for screening before it was sent to the mayor for
approval. The government oﬃce, staﬀed with junior oﬃcials, rejected the
proposal and did not send it to the mayor. The message was simple:
charged services could become a jumping-oﬀ board for corruption and
should not be encouraged. The decision of the government oﬃce was not
consistent with the rule of hierarchy commonly found in the Chinese bu-
reaucracy, but instead was consistent with the new philosophy in Shunde.
The third factor contributing to Shunde’s success is that it has a viable
local economy. Although many ﬁrms were in the red when Shunde’s priva-
tization program began in the early 1990s, their losses were not created by
their nonviability in the market, but rather by their mismanagement.
Shunde is a production base for China’s home electronics, an industry with
continuously expanding domestic and international demand. Governance
reform involves a trade-oﬀ between decreasing bureaucratic support and
increasing social output. But a better local economy makes it easier for so-
cial output to increase, so, as our theoretical model predicts, the politi-
cian’s willingness to engage in the reform is enhanced. In addition, a better
local economy also makes layoﬀs easier as the private sector is more ca-
pable of absorbing the laid-oﬀ workers.
The last factor contributing to Shunde’s success is its well-designed re-
form plan. This plan was not formed from the very beginning, but has been
revised and enhanced in the course of the reform. Laid-oﬀ workers were
not simply thrown out of the government; instead, they were ﬁrst put into
government-supported companies in the transition period. Afterward,
these companies were privatized and the workers gradually were absorbed
by the private sector. For workers remaining in the government, a major
measure for boosting their morale was to increase their wages. The income
of a government employee is now above the average in the private sector.
However, even this wage is not enough to balance a person’s desire for cor-
rupt income. As a complement, the Shunde government maintains an ac-
tive promotion system that puts able oﬃcials into important positions. In
addition, the new administrative philosophy gives government oﬃcials a
sense of honor as well as responsibility, which plays an important role in
guarding the integrity of the administration.
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The transition from a planned economy to a market economy is not
merely a transformation of ownership, but also a transformation of state
governance. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the transfor-
mation of ownership was accomplished almost overnight, but initial per-
formance records were uniformly bad. After almost a decade, some coun-
tries (such as Poland and the Czech Republic) have improved their
performance records, but many of them (especially those in the former So-
viet Union) are still in deep trouble. As Shleifer (1997) pointed out, the di-
verse performance records in Poland and Russia were a result of their
diﬀerent types of state governance, especially in the area of rule of law. The
Shunde experience provides yet another example.
The problem with Russia is not so much with its economy, but rather
with its state governance. In particular, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the fall of the communist regime created a power vacuum. In the pro-
cess of ﬁlling this vacuum, special-interest groups and monopolists have
captured the state. China is luckier than Russia for not having gone
through the destruction of the state apparatus. The danger, of course, is
that without that destruction, China may be stuck with the old system and
may never be able to build a sound state governance structure. In this re-
gard, privatization as forced by ﬁnancial problems may well provide an op-
portunity for China to take on serious governance reform, starting with the
government itself. Right now, government reform at the central level is
ﬁnished; the central government has reduced its size by 15 percent, and
twenty ministries have been eliminated. Reform at the local level is under-
way and radical downsizing is expected. With China’s economy being pri-
vatized continuously, the government reform may well be sustainable, so
the synergy of a private-ownership-based economy and a sound state gov-
ernance structure can be formed.
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Comment David D. Li
This paper addresses the issue of when privatization works or fails to work.
This is a very important issue because in reality, privatization programs of-
ten fall short of expectations in improving enterprise performance and in
enhancing social welfare, and may even backﬁre and lead to back-sliding
of the overall reform program. More importantly, the issue is more relevant
than the issue of whether privatization should be implemented but has at-
tracted less research so far. Understanding the issue well is critical to bet-
ter design of privatization programs.
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Economic Development at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.The issue of when privatization works arises from the fact that privati-
zation is only a nominal transfer of ownership from the government to pri-
vate hands. There is no guarantee that after privatization, the government,
being the strongest player in most economies, continues to lend a heavy
hand in the actual decisions of the private enterprises. Neither is there as-
surance that other parties, for instance, managers of enterprises who are
not owners, take advantage of the retreat of the government and encroach
on the control rights of the new owners.
Existing wisdom points to three general sets of conditions that induce
success of a privatization program. The ﬁrst is solid legal institutions that
help deﬁne the rights of property owners. With the beneﬁt of such institu-
tions, new owners of privatized enterprises can expect to exercise their con-
trol rights in order to implement necessary changes for improving the per-
formance of the enterprise. Of course, emerging market economies, which
usually hope to establish functioning legal institutions via rapid privatiza-
tion, can only wish such mechanisms were in existence.
Without the beneﬁt of the rule of law, one alternative is to select suit-
able new owners to take over the privatized enterprises from the govern-
ment. Suitable owners are ones who are strong enough to fend oﬀ post-
privatization government interventions and guard against managerial
abuses. One class of candidate is foreign corporations that are large and
mobile and therefore are better positioned than domestic owners.
This paper provides a new perspective on this issue. The central message
is that the government can and should precommit to certain mechanisms
before privatization. With the precommitted mechanism, it is more diﬃ-
cult for the government to interfere in the operation of privatized enter-
prises and therefore improved performance of the privatized enterprises is
more likely.
At an abstract level, the message makes a lot of intuitive sense and it is
interesting to see it delivered in a coherent theoretical framework. We of-
ten do see that successful privatization is preceded or accompanied by ma-
jor reforms of the government. Failed privatization programs are often
those that were single-mindedly intended to privatize enterprises without
concurrent reforms.
However, what exactly are the commitment mechanisms? This paper
stops short of making this explicit. From the context of the discussion,
these mechanisms might include shrinking the scope of control of the gov-
ernment, reducing the size of the government, simplifying regulatory set-
up of the government, and others. Yet, in reality, these diﬀerent measures
of reform have diﬀerent implications for the post-privatization operation
of enterprises. It helps sharpen the predictions of the theoretical model if
the paper makes explicit the assumptions of which mechanisms it refers to.
The thrust of the theoretical model comes from the assumption that the
commitment that the government makes and the diﬃculty with which the
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complementary. That is, the more commitment the government makes, the
more diﬃcult for the government to interfere. Again, it helps to be speciﬁc
on this assumption. What kind of interference does the paper refer to? Why
does such interference become more diﬃcult for the government to make?
Why, with stronger precommitment, is the interference more costly to the
government?
The power of a theory lies in its ability to generate testable predications.
This paper is no exception. By raising the issue of precommitment before
privatization, the paper makes intuitive appeals but lacks a sequence of
predictions for the reader to chew on and for future empirical work to test.
The lack of more speciﬁc reference to the key assumptions leads to the lack
of speciﬁc predictions. I believe that future research in this area will bene-
ﬁt from this line of exploration.
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